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A ‘Most Astonishing’ Circumstance: The Survival of Jewish POWs in German War 
Captivity during the Second World War 
  
During the Second World War, more than 60,000 Jewish members of the 
American, British and French armed forces became prisoners of war in 
Germany. Against all expectations, these prisoners were treated in accordance 
with the 1929 Geneva Convention and the majority made it home alive. This 
article seeks to explain this most astonishing circumstance. It begins by 
collating the references to the experiences of Western Jewish POWs from the 
historical literature to provide a hitherto-unseen overview of their treatment in 
captivity. It then asks what made their protection from persecution possible. To 
this end, it explores Germany’s wider motivations for its selective application of 
the Geneva Convention and highlights the role that military identity played in 
making its application seem necessary for all POWs from the Western front. 
 
Keywords: prisoners of war; war captivity; World War 2; Jews; Germany, 
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Introduction 
In the Second World War, between 12 and 35 million people became prisoners of 
war. Germany alone took up to 8 million prisoners (Davis, 1977: 624). Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, war captivity has been said to be ‘on a par with, if not exceeding, combat as one of 
the most common experiences for those in uniform’ (Moore and Fedorowich, 1996: 1), and 
both memoirs and historical studies of this experience in different parts of the world abound.  
There is, however, a relatively small group of POWs whose experiences have so far 
attracted little scholarly attention despite the fact that they are of interest to both historical 
and legal scholarship. The POWs in question are American, British and French (henceforth 
referred to as ‘Western’) servicemen1 of Jewish faith who were captured by Germany. While 
little detail is known about their lives in captivity, it is known that this group of prisoners did 
not suffer the lethal force applied to Jews elsewhere in Germany and German-occupied 
territories. This is a surprising fact. As Yves Durand (1999: 73) puts it in respect of French 
Jewish POWs:  
 
It is most astonishing that French Jewish POWs, who were during the entire length of their 
imprisonment put up in the heart of the Third Reich, escaped the Holocaust, while their 
families remaining in France lost their lives. . . . This is certainly one of the most surprising 
paradoxes in the way the NS-regime functioned and in the behaviour patterns of the 
population or the decision makers that were subjected to this regime.2  
 
This article seeks to explain this most astonishing circumstance. The motivation for 
this endeavour stems from something Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer write at the end of 
their study of recorded conversations between captured German soldiers in Allied war 
captivity. Having chronicled and sought to explain these soldiers’ accounts of the terrifying 
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acts of violence they committed, Neitzel and Welzer (2012: 342, emphasis added) conclude 
that, rather than show surprise at such violence in war, ‘it would be more productive to ask 
whether and under what circumstances people can refrain from killing.’ For lawyers, this is 
an important question, particularly in relation to the Nazi period. After all, the Nazi regime 
had not only renounced the abstract values of natural law that are associated with the legal 
protection of the person, but purposefully employed law (as well as the non-legal state 
apparatus) in the service of national-socialist aims, foremost amongst which was to solve 
what it regarded as the Jewish problem (Fraenkel, 2017: 107ff). If fundamental legal 
protections of the person can so easily be dispensed with, any alternative way in which such 
protections might acquire force becomes significant. In this sense, the active protection of 
Western Jewish POWs by Germany under the Geneva Convention3 ought not to be dismissed 
as a mere historical anomaly but be explained.  
The article finds that compliance with the Convention could be attributed to neither of 
the three most often cited factors: legality, morality and considerations of utility. It puts 
forward an alternative explanation that points to the role that German military identity played 
in this respect. If correct, this explanation offers a new understanding of how law can acquire 
force through non-legal means.  
The article begins with some historical detail. It estimates the likely number of 
Western Jewish POWs in German hands from the figures available in the historical literature. 
It then brings together the existing references to the treatment of Western Jewish POWs. 
These references are currently scattered across a diverse set of sources, some of which are 
reputed historical works on POWs of a particular nation, others memoirs written from an 
entirely subjective point of view. There is no existing overview of what life in captivity was 
like for Western Jewish POWs, which is perhaps not surprising, as most research on the 
treatment of Jews by Nazi Germany focuses on the Holocaust. Indeed, it is in the shadow of 
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the Holocaust that this overview of POW life is presented, its prevalence of daily 
discrimination and harassment distinguished from the fate of those who fell victim to 
persecution, forced labour and unjustifiable death at the hands of the Nazis.  
 
Numbers 
The mortality rate of POWs held in Germany ranged from ca. 3.5% for Western 
Allied POWs to ca. 60% for Soviet POWs (Schulte, 1988: 181). These headline figures hide 
many variations in treatment, which makes it difficult to generalise about POW experience 
and its underlying causes (Rachamimov, 2012). It is, however, possible to say with some 
certainty that amongst all of those captured by Germany, members of the Western armed 
forces were in a good – even fortunate – position, and that this was chiefly due to the fact that 
Germany generally complied with the rules of the Geneva Convention in their respect. This 
meant that ‘prisoners of war in the West, though rarely happy with their condition, were at 
least reasonably sure of surviving until the end of hostilities’ (MacKenzie, 1995: 79). 
Within this group of Western POWs were a significant number of men of Jewish 
origin or faith. While there is no consensus on that number in the historical literature, it is 
clear that it was by no means negligible. In total, 1.4m Jews served in the combined Allied 
armies,4 of which approximately 200,000 fell into German hands (Krakowski and Gelber, 
1990: 1188-1189). Subtracting from this number the estimated 60,000-65,000 Polish and 
85,000 Soviet Jews captured by Germany,5 this gives a figure of between 50,000 and 55,000 
Jews for the remaining Allies. However, it is known that of the 1.8m French POWs alone 
who fell into German hands in 1940 (Overmans, 2005: 760), 55,000 were Jews (Spoerer, 
2005: 505).6 There are no precise numbers for American Jewish POWs, but it is established 
that overall 550,000 Jews served in the US armed forces, 35,157 of whom were killed, 
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wounded, captured or were reported missing in action. Excluding those who were killed or 
wounded in combat, this leaves 9,157 Jewish Americans who were killed in service 
generally, captured or missing in action.7 The number of British (excluding Commonwealth 
Canadian, Australian and South African) Jewish POWs is around 688 (Morris and Sugarman, 
2011: 339), in addition to at least 1,500 Jews from Palestine (Krakowski and Gelber, 1990: 
1191; Gelber, 1981), who were serving as volunteers in the British army and were treated as 
British. Overall, this means that even on a conservative estimate, over 60,000 American, 
British and French Jewish POWs found themselves in German war captivity during the war. 
 
The treatment of Jewish Western POWs 
Identification 
What seemed like an innocuous question when asked by the German camp staff 
filling in the registration cards for new arrivals – ‘Religion?’ – was for the Jewish prisoners a 
question that went to the heart not only of their faith, but also their identity. The Germans in 
their racist imagination saw the Jews as a homogenous group, but the Jewish POWs they had 
captured in fact included men from diverse linguistic, cultural and ethnic backgrounds. In 
relation to French POWs, for example, Jewish prisoners included men from North Africa, the 
Alsace, recent immigrants to France from Eastern Europe and members of the traditional 
French elite, each with their own religious identity. As Richard (2018: 12) points out, these 
different backgrounds resulted in a ‘variety of identity positionings.’ In addition to these 
positionings, feelings of fear as well as defiance in the face of possible danger also 
determined each man’s answer.  
Some, like the writer Roger Ikor (1975: 90), who was an atheist and took the question 
in its most literal sense, did not disclose the fact that they were Jews. Others, like the 
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philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, openly declared themselves when asked, in Levinas’s case 
in the firm expectation of being singled out and killed or transferred to a concentration camp 
(Malka, 2006: 262). Some thought that concealing their Jewish identity would be pointless, as 
their name would give them away in any case (Berg, 1990: 201), but others gave a false name 
for this purpose (Bories-Sawala, 1996a: 240).8 American POWs had perhaps the least choice 
in this respect, as their dog tags were already stamped with an ‘H’ for Hebrew, ‘so the correct 
chaplain could be called if a soldier was wounded or killed’ (Bard, 1994: 37). Nonetheless, 
some American Jews managed to hide their faith by swapping their dog tags with colleagues 
(Bard, 1994: 37 and 71; Durand, 1988: 209). That despite these efforts, and despite the fact 
that there were no systematic attempts to identify all Jews, the Germans knew about a 
substantial number of Jewish men amongst their POW populations, becomes readily apparent 
from the targeted harassment of Jewish POWs as well as their segregation into separate living 
and working units.   
 
Convention breaches, discrimination and harassment   
There is overall agreement in the literature that Western Jewish POWs did not receive 
significantly different treatment than that of their non-Jewish colleagues.9 The German policy 
was also ‘to separate Jewish prisoners of war from the other prisoners of war of the same 
nationality,’ but to accord them equal treatment ‘“in all other respects”’ (Levie, 1977: 175 n. 
324, reference omitted; Favez, 1999: 124). However, there is evidence that Jewish POWs 
were nevertheless subjected to discrimination and harassment on account of their faith, some 
of it in breach of their Convention rights. This was not least enabled by first the 
identification, and, from 1941, the separation of Jewish POWs from other prisoners into their 
own living and working units, which in itself constituted a violation of the Convention. 
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Datner (1964: 105) appears to suggest that this separation was not carried out for British and 
American officers, but by autumn 1944, the policy certainly applied to officer camps as well 
(Favez, 1999: 124), even if it encountered a certain measure of resistance, particularly in 
British camps.  
At its worst, some newly captured Jewish combatants appear to have been executed 
on capture or transferred to concentration camps, although such accounts, often told by non-
Jewish prisoners who watched their Jewish comrades being taken away, may be speculative 
(Bard, 1994: 37-39; Winograd, 1976: 17; Foy, 1984: 130). Mitchell Bard (1994: 77ff) details 
one definite instance in which 80 American Jews were sent to a hard-labour camp at Berga, 
in which civilian Jews (who were victims of the Holocaust) also worked (also see Cohen, 
2005). This constituted an action specifically aimed at Jewish POWs, even if once there, they 
did not receive treatment that was substantively different from that of non-Jewish American 
POWs who had also been sent there for punishment. Morris and Sugarman (2011: 336) 
mention the deaths of 12 Palestinian Jewish POWs in retaliatory action by German soldiers, 
although it is not clear whether this action was linked to the POWs’ faith. Direct retaliations, 
carried out after German soldiers were ambushed by POWs or civilians, were a common 
feature of the war.  
In the middle of the spectrum of maltreatment, there are reports that ‘sick and 
wounded Jewish POWs were being removed generally from lists of prisoners eligible for 
repatriation’ (Favez, 1999: 122) and that Jewish inmates had to carry out especially 
humiliating or strenuous work (Durand, 1999: 73; 1982: 354). They were being tasked with 
‘cleaning the outside latrines and perform other dirty tasks the rest of the POWs did not have 
to do’ (Bard, 1994: 75; also see Foy, 1984: 130), were made to clear unexploded bombs 
(Bard, 1994: 40-41; Foy, 1984: 130-131), and Roger Berg (1990: 201) states that the special 
work units or ‘commandos’ to which Jews were assigned were ‘in most cases’ disciplinary in 
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nature. However, Pierre Gascar (1967: 54) finds that conditions in work detachments in 
which French Jews were placed were ‘not much harsher than elsewhere.’ As to descriptions 
of French Jewish POWs of non-commissioned officer (NCO) rank as being subjected to 
forced labour,10 these should be treated with caution, as the ‘encouragements’ (Durand, 1999: 
7) of French NCOs by their own representatives to sign work contracts, aided on the German 
side by the application of ‘massive pressure’ (Bories-Sawala, 1996a: 228), applied to all 
French NCOs. It should be born in mind, however, that any threats of transfer to a camp in 
the East would have been more effective against Jews than against non-Jewish POWs.11 
Indeed, the distinction between working Jewish POWs and forced labourers is 
important to uphold, not least in order to give recognition to the fate of millions of civilian 
forced labourers who worked in Germany under an entirely different legal regime devoid of 
the protections that Western POWs enjoyed, some of them becoming victims of the 
Holocaust. In comparison, the fate of Western POWs has been described as one of ‘relative 
privilege’ (Bories-Sawala, 1996a: 215). For example, when Lador-Lederer (2011: 150) 
mentions that ‘200 British Jewish prisoners of war [were] allocated to the Janina mines in 
Upper Silesia,’ this does not necessarily mean that these prisoners were maltreated, even 
though work in the mining sector was generally harder and was therefore less preferred than 
work in the agricultural sector (Bories-Sawala, 1996a: 216-217). Doubts about whether the 
employment of British Jews in the mine is evidence for their maltreatment particularly arise 
in light of the fact that in 1943 these prisoners were replaced with prisoners from Auschwitz 
because of the former’s low productivity, likely due to ‘frequent sabotage and refusal to 
work’ (Memorial and Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau). This was itself a sign of relative 
privilege, as such subversive actions were not generally open to victims of the Holocaust.  
Often, however, Jews simply suffered a litany of smaller harassments such as slaps 
(Winograd, 1976: 7), kicks, blows from rifle butts (Bard, 1994: 40-41) and beatings 
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(Rubenstein, 1989: 15, 31, 44), and sometimes they were denied representative positions in 
their camps because members of the German camp administration refused to deal with them 
on account of their faith (Levie, 1977: 299 n. 163; Foy, 1984: 130; Morris and Sugarman, 
2011: 335). Before a directive was issued in March 1942 that clarified that no such 
identification was to be applied to POWs (Vourkoutiotis, 2003: 41), some Jewish POWs may 
also have been required to wear a yellow star or letters on their uniform that identified them 
as Jews. After surveying the available evidence, Yves Durand (1982: 356), however, 
concludes that such cases were rare (also see Hilberg, 1985: 627). 
Jewish doctors and medical personnel were the objects of a number of discriminatory 
policies in violation of the Convention. Favez (1999: 122) writes that ‘these prisoners were 
forbidden to care for their compatriots in the hospitals and camps and were not designated for 
repatriation [in line with the Convention] either.’ French Jewish doctors were certainly 
denied repatriation during the Relève des médecins in 1943, although any benefits of such 
repatriation would have been doubtful given the treatment of civilian Jews in France (Bories-
Sawala, 1996a: 241 and n. 95). Their fate in war captivity may not, however, have been much 
better, as Jewish doctors were sometimes employed to look after those that had fallen ill in 
epidemics without receiving prior vaccinations (Stelzl-Marx, 2000: 77; Durand, 1982: 354; 
Berg, 1990: 201), often in camps near the Eastern front (Favez, 1999: 7 and 122). 
 
Anti-Semitism 
Jewish POWs also suffered from a certain amount of prejudice and discrimination 
from their own colleagues, often actively encouraged by the Germans. Rüdiger Overmans 
(2005: 766), for example, refers to a proposal issued by the commander of one camp to 
separate Jewish prisoners from the rest of the officers, which could only be implemented 
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without using force after the anti-Semitic sentiments of inmates had been successfully 
strengthened. Foy (1984: 129-130) writes about a camp where Jewish American POWs were 
‘never physically abused,’ but where the German authorities ‘allowed the guards to try to 
incite the other POWs against their Jewish comrades, which lead the POWs to keep the true 
numbers of Jews amongst them secret.’ 
However, not all Germans working in POW camps were signed up to the racial 
ideology of the Nazis. This may have been due to the fact that it was mainly older veterans 
from the First World War and less politically reliable soldiers who were assigned to POW 
camps (Morris and Sugarman, 2011: 335). Arthur Durand (1988: 307), for example, recounts 
how a German Deputy Commandant concealed the faith of a Jewish POW who had died, so 
that a funeral with military honours could be given to him (also see Rubenstein, 1989). 
Unsurprisingly though, many of the Germans working in POW camps held anti-Semitic 
views, and the POW administration as a whole was certainly anti-Semitic in its outlook. 
Arthur Barker (1974: 165) thus recounts how an English language newspaper distributed by 
the Germans, called ‘The Camp,’ crudely attempted to stir anti-Semitic feelings by referring 
to ‘the exploitation of the “Anglo-Saxons” by “world Jewry.”’ Jean-Marie d’Hoop (1981: 9) 
also writes about German propaganda films being shown in officer camps, including the film 
‘Jud Süß.’12  
Another way in which Jewish POWs were confronted with anti-Semitism was through 
contact with German civilians, usually in the course of their work. The civilian population 
was already warned off fraternization with POWs generally (Christiansen, 1994: 34), but for 
Jewish POWs this enforced distance took on another dimension. Levinas (2001: 41) thus 
recounts how German villagers looked at him and his fellow POWs as Jews rather than as 
human beings, with all the negative connotations that this term entailed at the time: ‘The 
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villagers certainly did not injure us or do us any harm, but their expressions were clear. We 
were the condemned and the contaminated carriers of germs.’ 
As to anti-Semitism amongst the POWs themselves, the worst cases appear to have 
occurred within the French armed forces. Helga Bories-Sawala writes in this respect that even 
though solidarity between colleagues prevailed overall (also see Datner, 1964: 106 and 
Shneyer, 2016: 69-70), the behaviour of some POWs echoed the anti-Semitic politics of the 
Vichy government (Bories-Sawala, 1996a: 239; d’Hoop, 1981: 13; Richard, 2018: 17). At 
least one high-ranking French officer specifically requested the separation of named Jewish 
POWs into separate commandos from their German colleagues (Bories-Sawala, 1996a: 240), 
and both Yves Durand (1982: 355) and Berg (1990: 201-202) recount an instance in which an 
influential French POW tried to accomplish that his Jewish colleagues were required to wear 
the yellow star, only to be rebuffed by the German camp commander. D’Hoop (1981: 13) 
lists a number of instances in which French Jews were harassed by their colleagues, including 
one where a rector of a camp university was forced to step down on account of his faith. He 
also writes that when French Jewish officers were required to be separated and the camp 
administration needed to ascertain their identities, they were often denounced by their 
colleagues (d’Hoop, 1981: 14). Unsurprisingly, therefore, Yves Durand (1982: 356) 
concludes from accounts of repatriated POWs that despite the often close solidarity between 
colleagues in the French forces, anti-Semitic sentiments were common:  
 
The racism of some French seems to have exceeded that of German officers, if one is to 
believe the testimony cited above. The truth obliges us to say that obvious traces of anti-
Semitic spirit were sometimes expressed in the words of repatriated POWs; some denouncing 
the Jews as responsible for the black market in the camps, others for the political opposition 
to Maréchal Pétain, some for shady collusions with German guards. 
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In relation to American POWs, Foy (1984: 130) reports that some Jews were treated 
worse by their colleagues than by their German captors, but others list a number of instances 
in which American non-Jewish soldiers helped their Jewish colleagues to hide their faith 
from the Nazis (Bard, 1994: 37 and 71; Durand, 1988: 209), actions that must have come 
with significant risks. Howard Levie (1977: 175 n. 324) also notes that the German camp 
administration sometimes encountered resistance from the rest of the American prisoners 
when they tried to separate Jewish prisoners from them.  
As to the British, Krakowski and Gelber (1990: 1191) write that non-Jewish 
colleagues were supportive of the fact that the Germans treated British Jews in the same way 
as all other British POWs. Gelber (1981: 19) in this respect reports an incident where the 
Germans wanted to deny Red Cross parcels to Palestinian Jewish POWs, but were resisted by 
the British Man of Confidence,13 who declared that in that case, ‘the British too would refuse 
to get their parcels.’ He concludes that ‘anti-Semitic manifestations on the part of British 
POWs were rare; more common were the friendly contacts that prevailed, and along with 
joint cultural and social activities, escapes also constituted joint ventures’ (Gelber, 1981: 39; 
also see Shneyer, 2016: 72). Morris and Sugarman (2011: 335 and 336) confirm this when 
they write that senior British officers and Men of Confidence successfully resisted the 
segregation of Jewish POWs, acting in solidarity with their Jewish colleagues (also see 
MacKenzie, 2004: 274). Where it occurred, hostility against Jews seems to have arisen 
because of their ability to communicate and trade with the Germans, from which they were 
able to derive some advantages (MacKenzie, 2004: 80 and 273-275). 
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Fears and forebodings 
It can thus be concluded that life in captivity for a Western Jewish POW turned out to 
be harder than for non-Jewish POWs, even if a threat to their life was the exception rather 
than the norm. However, one should at this point consider that despite this fact, Jewish POWs 
may have lived in constant fear for their lives. Although the full extent of the Holocaust only 
became apparent after the war, enough was known to raise fears of the worst at least in newly 
captured Jewish POWs. Even where no maltreatment followed the identification of Jews or 
their separation from their non-Jewish colleagues, its prospect accompanied captivity and lent 
significance to any threats of transfer to the Gestapo that were sometimes employed during 
interrogations (Winograd, 1976: 11; Durand, 1988: 66). This was not surprising, given that 
the same steps of identifying and separating Jews from the rest of the population preceded the 
killing of Jews elsewhere in Germany and German-controlled territories. It would not have 
been apparent to POWs that the same fate was not planned also for them (Datner, 1964: 98 
and 106-107). Levinas (2009: 210), for example, who was officially interned at Stalag XIB at 
Fallingbostel near Hanover for five years, but who spent his time on a disused farm in a small 
forestry work detachment comprised of Jewish POWs, reflects as follows on his experience: 
 
The Jewish prisoners felt the deferred death sentences that hung over their work and their 
laughter like a familiar shadow. In the special Kommandos in which they were grouped, for 
the most part lost at some point in a forest, they found themselves at once separated from 
other prisoners and the civilian population. It was as if something was being prepared for 
them, but always postponed. 
 
These forebodings were in part due to the rumours that had spread amongst POWs 
about the treatment of civilian Jews by Hitler (Rolf, 1988: 73). News about deportations of 
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friends and family members reached French POW camps by way of returned mail marked 
‘left without leaving a forwarding address,’ and Levinas (2009: 210) writes after the war that 
they knew what this meant because they ‘knew of the mass exterminations of Jews in Eastern 
Europe’ (also see Levinas, 2009: 206-207). But there were also direct encounters with 
victims of the Holocaust, often in the course of the POW’s work (Rolf, 1988: 73). For 
instance, once during his captivity, Levinas saw a column of deportees destined for the 
nearest concentration camp and sensed the extent of the tragedy that was unfolding around 
him (Malka, 2006: 263). It has also been reported that Levinas and his Jewish colleagues 
clandestinely threw food over the fence of the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen to starving 
women when the opportunity arose (Gutman, 2011: 23). Krakowski and Gelber (1990: 1191) 
similarly recount an instance in which British Palestinian Jews were sent to a work 
detachment where they came into contact with Jewish forced labourers ‘who told them of the 
atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis’ and to whom they smuggled food (also see Gelber, 1981: 
20-21 and 24). Gelber (1981: 17) writes that the uncertainty surrounding the treatment of 
Jewish POWs resulted in a ‘feeling of isolation,’ but also ‘a growing sense of comradeship 
and common fate,’ while Gascar (1967: 54-55) writes that their anguish of knowing about the 
fate of Jews elsewhere rendered the captivity of Jewish POWs a more cruel one than that of 
others, offsetting any relief they might have felt at their own protection. 
French POWs in particular perceived their situation as perilous. Due to the actions of 
the French government in relation to its Jewish citizens at the time, they had little hope of 
support from their home side. Although they were still protected by the French uniform, 
French Jewish prisoners felt the most ‘bitter disappointment’ at their betrayal on the part of 
France (Christophe, 1974: 39), leading Levinas (2009: 207) to write: ‘Others spoke reform, 
relief, liberation – the Israelite knew he was in a tough world, without affection, without 
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fatherhood. He existed without recourse to humans. He assumed alone all the weight of his 
existence.’  
 This provides context to recollections that otherwise may be misunderstood. For 
example, when Leonard Winograd (1976: 15) writes about ‘the ever present horror of being a 
Jew in prison in Germany,’ he is likely to be referring to the fear or threat of rather than 
actual maltreatment. As an American air force officer – the most privileged group of POWs – 
Winograd himself thus did not experience anything worse than an either too hot or too cold 
cell during his interrogation. Thinking of how he would tell this story after the war, he 
pondered: ‘I could always say that I had met the enemy and “my head was bloody but 
unbowed” – except that it wasn’t even bloody. It was cold and it was sweaty, but it was not at 
all bloody’ (Winograd, 1976: 11).  
 
Daily normality 
Not only was the treatment of Jewish POWs rarely bloody even when it was unequal, 
but life as a Jewish POW also afforded a certain extent of normality as well as some small 
pleasures. For example, no special provisions were made relating to Jews practicing their 
religion (Vourkoutiotis, 2003: 65), and Foy (1984: 101 and 129) accordingly writes that 
American Jewish POWs were able to conduct weekly religious services at one Luftwaffe 
camp. This was also the case for Levinas and his French colleagues, although they appear to 
have celebrated their religious holidays clandestinely rather than openly. Richard (2018: 25) 
writes evocatively about the improvisation involved:  
 
The resourcefulness that characterized the captive universe was put at the service of Judaism, 
illustrating a form of adaptability and creativity: In many Judenbaracke [Jewish barrack], a 
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space was devoted to the practice of worship, acting as a makeshift synagogue, and certain 
prisoners reconstructed prayer books from their memory. The Shabbat was thus celebrated, 
with the means at hand, according to time constraints, sometimes in the light of boxes of 
sardines transformed into candles.  
 
For some of the prisoners, the shared experiences and anxieties of being a Jew in 
German war captivity brought about a renewal of their Jewish faith and identity (Levinas, 
2009; Richard, 2018). Jews came together in helping each other, sharing food parcels, 
exchanging information about the situation at home and comforting each other when they 
received news about the arrest and deportation of family members or when communication 
simply broke off. Diasporic micro-communities, in which Rabbis played a central role, thus 
emerged (Richard, 2018). 
Even where Jewish POWs had to work, such as in Levinas’s case, evenings and days 
off provided time for reading, the studying and writing of philosophical and spiritual works, 
for diary keeping and for theatrical performances (Jacques, 2017, Richard, 2018). Each main 
camp had a library and bookbindery stocked by the YMCA and the Red Cross, and book 
boxes circulated amongst the work detachments (Christiansen, 1994: 47). Jewish prisoners 
were able to receive letters and parcels, both from family members and the Red Cross, and 
access basic health care services, either through the main camps or local doctors assigned to 
work detachments (Rodgold). In Levinas’s case, a dog seems to have been allowed to live 
with the prisoners, and while life in captivity lacked many comforts, it had a romantic aspect 
that Levinas and his colleagues appreciated (Levinas, 1990; Jacques, 2017).  
Larger camps sometimes afforded more structured leisure activities. Krakowski and 
Gelber (1990: 1191) thus write about British Palestinian Jews in one large camp: ‘In this 
camp the Jews were treated like the rest of the prisoners. Keeping to themselves, they 
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developed support groups and even organized classes in Hebrew and other subjects.’ Shneyer 
(2016: 74) even cites accounts of Jewish participation in camp sporting competitions that 
involved raising a flag with the star of David in honour of Jewish winners and the marching 
of the Jewish team to their ‘Company Song’ sung in Hebrew.  
Not all Jewish prisoners would have had the same experience of war captivity; their 
rank, the camp’s size, its location and the outlook of its administrative personnel, but also the 
work that POWs were asked to do contributed to the conditions they found themselves in. 
While few would have been able to look back on their time in war captivity as a time of 
sporting endeavours and audacious dares in the way that some non-Jewish English and 
American members of the air force were (Smith, 1968), their experience was a far cry from 
that of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. As Lador-Lederer (2011: 146) writes, ‘for the 
Jewish prisoner of war of a Western country who benefited from the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention of 1929, his sufferings measured against yardsticks of Jewish 
martyrology, were a matter de minimis.’ 
 
Explaining the protection of Western Jewish POWs 
What enabled the protection of Jewish Western POWs by Germany in the midst of an 
otherwise entirely unrestrained campaign of anti-Semitic violence? This question has no easy 
answer, not least because the Wehrmacht did not draw up policies relating to Western Jewish 
POWs that would shine a light on the underlying motivations for the inclusion of Jewish 
POWs within the protections of the Geneva Convention (Overmans, 2005: 872). Any 
explanation offered therefore has to be constructed from other facets of the complex 
relationship between Germany and its different enemies. In the end, a successful explanation 
should answer the questions why it was Western Jewish POWs that were protected (while 
Page 18 of 37 
Eastern ones were not), and why the same attitude that led to the protection of Western 
Jewish POWs was not also extended to Western civilian Jews. The discussion below will 
therefore proceed, firstly, by highlighting the difference in treatment of Western and 
Eastern14 POWs generally, before exploring, secondly, some of the more commonly-cited 
explanations for this difference in treatment and arguing, thirdly, that it was aspects of 
military identity set within specific relations of enmity that made the protection of Western 
Jewish POWs not only possible, but appear necessary. The article will end by considering 
why the protection afforded to Western Jewish POWs was not also extended to Western 
civilian Jews.     
 
The difference in treatment of Western and Eastern POWs 
The question whether Germany complied with the requirements of the Geneva 
Convention in relation to Allied POWs from the Western front is invariably answered 
affirmatively (Overmans, 1999: 14; Beaumont, 1996: 279; MacKenzie, 1995: 79). 
Compliance with the Geneva Convention by Germany15 is most readily certified in relation to 
American and British POWs, particularly in relation to officers and air force personnel. 
Indeed, the care extended to American and British POWs by the authorities went so far as to 
cause resentment amongst the German population, which itself suffered food and medical 
shortages at the time (Shneyer, 2016: 20). However, major breaches of the Convention did 
occur even in relation to this group, exemplified by the reprisals in the shackling crisis and 
the execution of prisoners after the attempted mass escape at Stalag Luft III at Sagan. Minor 
breaches were common. Indeed, one only needs to open POW accounts of ordinary American 
soldiers, such as William Spanos (2010), to realise that war captivity could be hellish, and 
that the leisurely life that some American officers enjoyed was by no means the standard for 
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all. This divergence of experiences even in the most privileged group of POWs shows how 
dependent conditions were on specific constellations of events, local circumstances and the 
personalities in positions of power, regardless of the nationality or faith of the prisoners.   
French POWs were in a slightly different position, as the particular relation between 
France and Germany after 1940 meant that Germany was able to disregard some of the 
requirements of the Convention, compliance therefore being merely partial. After conducting 
a considerable amount of research on French POWs held by Germany, Yves Durand (1999: 
72) nevertheless concludes that the German military kept to its obligations under the 
Convention, even though he also mentions exceptions.16  
In contrast, Germany did not apply the laws of war at all to POWs from the Eastern 
front. Captured soldiers from the Soviet Union, who often arrived in captivity in an ill and 
under-nourished state (Streim, 1982: 14), were either specifically targeted and killed because 
of their political or religious status, maltreated, or simply left to die until the spring of 1942, 
at which point more than two million prisoners had already died. When it dawned on 
Germany that no quick victory would be achieved on the Eastern front and that therefore the 
men deployed there were unlikely to return to their civilian jobs in the foreseeable future 
(Speckner, 2003: 177), the economic need for the labour of Soviet POWs took precedence 
over military aims, and it was determined to keep Soviet prisoners at least alive (Herbert, 
1997: 141). However, this did not substantially change the nature of their fate. Living and 
working conditions for Soviet POWs were dismal, and in the mining industry so bad that 
Ulrich Herbert (1997: 391) writes of ‘a continuation of the war of extermination by other 
means.’ Beaumont (1996: 279) estimates that in total ‘probably over three million Soviet 
POWs were executed or died of starvation or overwork at the hands of the ideologically and 
racially obsessed Nazi regime.’  
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Explanations of the selective compliance with the Convention 
A number of explanations have been advanced to explain why Germany complied 
with the Convention only on the Western front. These provide a starting point for thinking 
about the likely reasons for the protection of Jewish Western POWs.  
The first concerns the legality of Germany’s actions in relation to the servicemen it 
captured. Thus, one possible answer to the question why the Convention was complied with 
selectively is that at this time, despite the Convention’s and Red Cross symbol’s aspirations 
to universality, the Convention applied only between signatories, and the Soviet Union was 
not amongst them. However, Germany’s claim that it was not obliged to provide for Soviet 
POWs under the Geneva Convention because it had neither been signed nor ratified by the 
Soviet Union can be considered a mere pretext. As Christian Streit (1990: 1192) points out, 
general international law on the treatment of prisoners of war would have been sufficient to 
protect the lives of POWs if only it had been applied. 
The second explanation for the compliance with the Convention on the Western side 
concerns matters of morality, more specifically a possible belief in the intrinsic value of 
every human being. Even leaving to one side that this could not explain Germany’s non-
compliance in the East, such a belief can be discounted. Germany had completed the 
ratification of the Convention in 1934 only for superficial, propaganda reasons (Overmans, 
2005: 729ff), and in relation to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 Overmans (2005: 
729) cites Hermann Göring as having remarked in front of the International Military Court in 
Nuremberg in 1946 that ‘if he had been conscious of what kind of fetters the German Reich 
had bound itself with through the signing of the Hague Conventions, he would have advised 
Hitler to break with them even before the beginning of the war.’ It is thus doubtful that what 
Simon MacKenzie (1994: 490) calls ‘the humanitarian ethos – broadly conceived to mean 
that the captured enemy soldier was regarded as possessing the same essentially human 
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nature as his captor’ was determinative in Germany’s compliance with the Convention in the 
West as a matter of national policy. Nor can it be argued that members of the Wehrmacht 
acted under moral restraints, a theory that has long been disproved by reference to the 
Wehrmacht’s conduct on the Eastern front (Streit, 1978).17   
And yet, something bound Germany sufficiently to the rules of the Convention to 
make compliance appear necessary in relation to American, British and French combatants. 
The third explanation, which concerns the utility of compliance in a situation in which 
reprisals were likely and, at least in relation to France, an atmosphere in which collaboration 
remained possible needed to be maintained, hold some promise. Indeed, when it comes to 
Western Jewish POWs, most authors point to concerns about possible reprisals (Bard, 1994: 
37; Poliakov, 1954: 142; Krakowski and Gelber, 1990: 1192; Overmans, 2005: 872; Shneyer, 
2016: 71 and 82; Hilberg, 1985: 627 and 654; Lador-Lederer, 2011: 147). However, while 
strategic reasons may have played a part in ensuring compliance once the parties had agreed 
to apply the Convention rules (MacKenzie, 1994: 491), they cannot be said to have been 
determining reasons for applying the Convention in the first place. Generally speaking, the 
persecution of Jews as a racial policy constituted an aim that was pursued by Hitler 
independently of any military objectives and at times even collided with their achievement 
(Herbert, 1991). In principle, Hitler thus had no qualms about endangering the lives of 
German soldiers in foreign captivity by maltreating foreign POWs held by Germany, as the 
Soviet example shows. Other examples of the sometimes counterproductive separation of 
racial from military policies are Hitler’s orders to keep starving Soviet prisoners in 
improvised enclosures in the occupied territories rather than employ them in Germany so as 
not to ‘contaminate’ Germany with their presence (Davis, 1977: 627), and to prohibit the 
donation of blood by POWs for use by Germans out of fear that some of this blood could be 
from people of Jewish origin (Cohen, 2005: 71-72; Vourkoutiotis, 2003: 62). Together, these 
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examples make it difficult to maintain that Jewish POWs were spared persecution only 
because it would have interfered with military objectives on the Western front.  
 
An alternative explanation 
An alternative explanation emerges when one considers the fact that the war to the 
West remained ‘a political struggle’ (MacKenzie, 1995: 97), while to the East it was all-out 
war. From the beginning, Hitler had regarded the war to the East not as ‘a formal battle 
between two states, to be waged in accordance with the rules of International Law, but as a 
conflict between two philosophies’ (Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel’s Nuremberg testimony, 
quoted in MacKenzie, 1994: 505). Accordingly, German propaganda described the conflict 
with the Soviet Union as one between two mutually exclusive worldviews, the Soviet one 
being branded ‘Jewish Bolshevism’ (Schulte, 1988: 228).  
For Hitler (quoted in Streim, 1982: 27), this meant specifically that the army had to 
distance itself from the traditional point of view that still held fast in the West, according to 
which enemy soldiers were comrades-in-arms united by a shared set of values and a sense of 
professional solidarity: ‘The communist is before [the war] not a comrade-in-arms and after 
[the war] not a comrade-in-arms.’ With nothing uniting the actors in this conflict, there was 
also nothing that called for restraint, as it was not the aim of the war in the East ‘to conserve 
the enemy’ (Hitler, quoted in Hartmann, 2009: 309, footnote omitted). Schulte (1988: 150) in 
this respect writes that ‘documents from the highest level impressed on the German troops 
[on the Eastern front] that they were engaged in an ideologically based racial war of 
extermination . . . that was by its very nature qualitatively different from the conventional war 
. . . conducted in the West.’ According to Hitler, the point in this war was not to win against 
the enemy, but to eradicate him once and for all (Streim, 1982: 27).  
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Germany thus approached its relation to its Eastern and Western enemies in two 
fundamentally different ways: To the East, local populations as separate entities were to 
disappear through eradication or assimilation, with Germany expanding into their territory, 
while to the West, relations between the enemies as separate entities were expected to outlast 
the war, hatred being understood merely as a symptom of current hostilities that should not 
replace mutual respect as the fundamental characteristic of relations.18 Accordingly, the 
commander of one POW camp (quoted in Durand, 1988: 308, footnote omitted) called on 
staff to comply with the Geneva Convention with the following words:  
 
I shall ask you not to forget one important fact: any war has to end sooner or later, and after a 
war the nations have to live together again. We cannot ask for the sympathy of the POW[s] 
we will release when this is over, but what we want to instil is a feeling of respect. They can 
say “I hate the Germans,” but they must think “I respect them.” 
 
In contrast, members of the Wehrmacht deployed in the East were actively encouraged by the 
political and military leadership to switch from an outlook informed by traditional views of 
enmity to one informed by national-socialist views (Streim, 1982: 31). While Hitler distrusted 
the military to carry out his political ambitions and therefore also employed other strategies to 
implement his plans (such as the tasking of the security forces with many of the practical 
aspects of the crimes (Hartmann, 2009: 63ff)), overall the propaganda efforts showed positive 
results, with Nazi ideology reaching the Wehrmacht in ‘the foremost zones of the German 
sphere of power,’ (Hartmann, 2009: 65), meaning members of the Wehrmacht directly 
engaged in combat.     
This understanding of the war in the East as being of a different nature than that in the 
West was supported by an assessment of Germany’s enemies in racial, cultural and military 
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terms. In the hierarchy of national-socialist ideology, Nordic and Western European peoples 
were situated above those from Russia and Eastern Europe. The Russians were thought to be 
of an inferior, less deserving nature (Römer, 2008: 327; Neitzel and Welzer, 2012: 98). This 
hierarchy was not just a matter of racist imagination, but had grown over time, influenced by 
historical and cultural factors, which perhaps explains why it was never stated in a ‘pure 
form’ (Bories-Sawala, 1996b: 94). Of particular significance in this respect was the 
experience of the First World War, when, as Overmans (2005: 871) writes, the Russians had 
already ‘been rated as culturally backward and were already then discriminated against.’ 
Their army was declared to exhibit a complete lack of the professionalism said to characterise 
Western armies, and they were presented as a threat against ‘the very existence of the 
German “Volk” whose task it was to defend European “Kultur” against the barbarian hordes’ 
(Schulte, 1989: 150).  
This negative assessment of the enemy not only served to justify the kind of war 
fought in the East, but also protected German self-understanding from being affected by the 
large-scale killing of Soviet POWs. Because German soldiers were not dealing with whom 
they regarded as equals, crimes could be perpetrated without the need to reflect on their own 
status as human beings. On the Western side, however, bad treatment was thought to also 
reflect badly on the German military and its members. Rolf (1988: 67) thus reproduces the 
following statement from official German guidance on the treatment of POWs: ‘The POW 
can expect to be treated with respect regarding his personage and his honour. Bad and 
degrading treatment is not compatible with German dignity.’19 Directions addressed at camp 
commanders for prisoners on the Western side also made it clear that ‘even small deviations 
from a firm but correct application of the Geneva Convention would reflect poorly on the 
honor of the German solider’ (Vourkoutiotis, 2003: 28, footnote omitted), and propaganda 
Page 25 of 37 
materials on both sides, showing the good treatment of Western POWs, served to evidence 
the captor nation’s humanity (Overmans, 2005: 732). 
Reading accounts of captured German soldiers boasting of their killing of civilians on 
both the Eastern and the Western front (Neitzel and Welzer, 2012), it is hard to countenance 
that any notion of honour, dignity or humanity was operative in the self-understanding of 
German soldiers. However, one should keep in mind that compliance with honour-based rules 
have featured in war alongside the commission of atrocities since antiquity without necessary 
contradiction. To give one stark example, German fighter pilots in the Second World War 
prided themselves on shooting down women, children and livestock, but would have thought 
it dishonourable to kill an enemy fighter pilot who had ejected himself from his aircraft 
(Neitzel and Welzer, 2012: 66 and 75).  
The laws of war regarding the treatment of POWs were such honour-based rules, the 
Geneva Convention itself harking back to the laws of war in the late Middle Ages or the ‘Age 
of Chivalry.’ These rules applied only between those who thought themselves to be equals, 
for whom they were a matter of self-understanding. Thus, when the laws of war were first 
codified, they were brief, as for officers of an aristocratic and thus largely homogenous 
background the need to comply with the rules that were now drawn up appeared self-evident 
(Oeter, 1999: 50). It is thus unsurprising that terms such as ‘honour,’ ‘chivalry’ and ‘chivalric 
customs’ (as well as ‘embarrassment’ and the need to ‘save face’ when official orders put 
staff in a position where they were required to go against such customs) feature prominently 
both in first-hand accounts of Western war captivity (see, for example, Durand, 1988: 306-
308) and in German directions seeking to dispel such notions in relation to Russian soldiers 
(MacKenzie, 1994: 508; Streim, 1982: 33-34 and 41; Rosas, 1976: 78). In relation to Western 
POWs, the idea of chivalry sometimes proved too much for the Nazi command, which, for 
example, saw French POWs as good workers and thought that this should inform their 
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treatment rather than any misplaced notions of ‘excessive chivalry’ (Bories-Sawala, 1996a: 
218-219 and 276ff). As Neitzel and Welzer show (2012: 144, 317 and 340), where such 
notions of honour and dignity were translated into concrete military norms and values, they 
proved to be an effective frame of reference for German soldiers, a frame of reference that 
determined their behaviour even in the absence of legal force. It was where such norms and 
values were either absent or where direct orders were given to contravene them that soldiers 
engaged in indiscriminate killing.  
 
Why the protection of Western Jewish POWs – and not civilians? 
When considered in the context of an honour-based military identity, it is less 
surprising than on first sight that the presence of Jews within captured Western armed forces 
presented an issue of ambivalence for the German POW administration, resulting in a lack of 
policies regarding their treatment. Jews were ranked lowest on the German ideological 
hierarchy, and the correct attitude towards them was one of hatred and contempt. However, 
as Western POWs, they were members of armies that were not only deserving of respect,20 
but also a source of self-respect for German servicemen.  
The last question to answer, then, is why this respect was not also extended to civilian 
Jews of Western nations. A first answer is that the framework was only operative within the 
military and not the security forces. This has nothing to do with the supposedly superior 
morality associated with the Wehrmacht vis-à-vis the SS and other security forces. As 
explained above, it was not morality but identity which was determinative, and only in 
relation to some, not to all of Germany’s enemies. In the security forces, however, this 
identity (and the history on which it was based) was not present, and as Ricoeur (1998: 19-
20) observes, the fact that it was the Wehrmacht and not the security forces who oversaw 
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POWs on the Western side was therefore a significant factor in the Jewish prisoners’ 
survival. 
A second answer emerges when one considers the secrecy employed in the ‘Final 
Solution.’ This secrecy was not possible under the Geneva Convention, where each POW 
was registered and notified to the protecting power upon arrival in the camp. The subsequent 
disappearance of Western Jewish POWs would almost certainly have reflected badly on 
Germany in the eyes of its Western enemies. Bearing in mind the equal status of these 
enemies as far as the German Wehrmacht was concerned, this would have impacted the 
German self-understanding in turn. MacKenzie (1994: 504) thus puts the emphasis on the 
embarrassment that knowledge about the persecution of Jewish POWs could have caused. He 
writes that it was only ‘because the secrecy and deception at the heart of the Final Solution 
could not be applied [to registered POWs]’ that they escaped the fate of civilian Jews (also 
see Datner, 1964: 107). This led to a situation in which Germany effectively had to overlook 
the fact that Jews were amongst Western POWs – or rather, in which it could only carry out 
small measures of discrimination and harassment that were less likely to attract the attention 
of its Western enemies.   
 
Conclusion 
The protection of Western Jewish POWs in German war captivity during the Second 
World War was an astonishing circumstance. Within a sea of anti-Semitic persecution, POW 
camps represented islands of protection for Western Jewish soldiers, making them ‘de facto 
the safest place for a Jew in the German sphere of influence’ (Overmans, 2005: 872). While 
this protection may appear incongruous, this article has argued that it can be explained by 
German military identity, operative only in relation to Germany’s Western enemies, that 
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incorporated notions of honour and dignity. This military identity would have been unsettled 
by the open maltreatment of Jewish Western POWs in contravention of the Geneva 
Convention.  
The identity argument avoids the commonly cited explanations of legality, morality or 
utility for compliance with the Convention, while also avoiding the exculpation of the 
Wehrmacht from its involvement in the crimes committed on the Eastern front and as part of 
the Holocaust. It shows the importance that identity can have for the application of law, 
where it makes compliance seem necessary in a situation in which law lacks other force. 
Identity limits the actions that are thought to be possible within a given setting; if law 
incorporates this identity, it can build on these limits through detailed rules. In the case of 
Western Jewish POWs, German military identity functioned to keep what Neitzel and Welzer 
(2012: 89) term war’s ‘floodgates of violence’ partially shut. However, that even this means 
of limiting violence was frequently ineffective, leading to breaches of the Convention and, in 
the Jewish case, daily discrimination and harassment, is clear from the historical evidence. 
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1 Almost exclusively men, although there were also some women serving as parachutists, in 
liaison and signals units and in auxiliary and medical roles (Datner, 1964: 110-114). 
2 Any English quotes from materials in a language other than English are the author’s own 
translations. 
3 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva July 27, 1929. The 
Convention governed the treatment of POWs during the Second World War, its provisions 
setting out, amongst other things, rules on the kinds of work POWs could be required to 
undertake, the respective roles of the detaining and protecting powers, the requirement to 
treat POWs humanely and their right to respect and honour.  
4 According to Joseph Lador-Lederer (2011: 149 n. 15), 40% of these served in the Red 
Army. Henry Morris and Martin Sugarman (2011: 269) mention a total number of 1.75m 
Jews in the combined Allied armies. 
5 This subtraction is necessary because Shmuel Krakowski and Yoav Gelber (1990: 1189-
1190) appear to include both in the 200,000 figure. 
6 Annette Wieviorka (2001: 106) gives a lower figure of 10,000-15,000 Jews. 
7 These numbers are extrapolated from those provided by Isidor Kaufman (1947: 349) and 
Martin Gallin (1986: 38-39). 
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8 There is also a suggestion that at least some British Jewish POWs may have changed their 
name and faith already when enlisting, foreseeing future capture (Morris and Sugarman, 
2011: 339). 
9 Szymon Datner (1964: 101) accordingly finds that ‘victimization’ of Jewish POWs even 
below officer status was either infrequent (French POWs) or hardly took place at all (British 
and American POWs). At least in 1942-1943, it was also the understanding of the ICRC that 
English speakers were excluded from the discriminatory measures that were applied to Jews 
(Jean-Claude Favez, 1999: 55 and 123). David Foy (1984: 129) concludes based on the 
interviews he conducted with ex-POWs that ‘a significant portion [of American Jewish 
POWs] were treated like any other POWs.’ Krakowski and Gelber (1990: 1189) state that 
‘Jewish soldiers from the armies of Western countries (the United States, Britain – including 
the Jewish units from Palestine – France, Canada and Australia) were treated no differently 
than other POWs from those countries except for some attempts that were made to separate 
them from the rest.’ Morris and Sugarman (2011: 335) write that ‘the experience of British 
and Commonwealth Jewish POWs of the Germans was a mixed but generally non-violent 
one’ and that ‘little discrimination was . . . shown.’ 
10 Howard Caygill (2010: 27) uses this term in relation to Levinas, who was an NCO. Sarah 
Hammerschlag (2012: 394) similarly states that Levinas was interned in a ‘Nazi labor camp,’ 
a term that suggests disciplinary labour rather than the ordinary work POWs could be 
expected to do. 
11 The French historian Fernand Braudel was sent to such a camp, partly on account of his 
‘intervention discouraging fellow inmates from offering voluntary labour to the Germans’ 
(Caygill, 2004: 159 n. 11). Nonetheless, some Jewish NCOs did refuse to work (Chambrun, 
1989: 52). 
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12 ‘Jud Süß’ was a highly successful German anti-Semitic propaganda film based on an 18th-
century Jewish court figure. It was produced in 1940 and should not be confused with Lion 
Feuchtwanger's 1925 novel of the same title. 
13 The Man of Confidence or ‘Vertrauensmann’ was a POW of senior rank who was elected 
by the prisoners to liaise between them and the camp administration. 
14 References to the East are used as a shorthand for the Soviet Union, without regard to the 
differences in treatment of the minorities serving in the Red Army and of the members of 
other Eastern European countries’ armed forces. The treatment of Polish Jewish POWs in 
particular is of interest, but exceeds the scope of this article. 
15 Meaning here the Wehrmacht. There are numerous reports of war crimes against Allied 
POWs by the Waffen SS (Neitzel and Welzer, 2012: 305-306).  
16 For examples of Convention breaches, see Hoch, 1992: 232-233. 
17 For a historical overview of the debate over the Wehrmacht’s conduct on the Eastern front, 
see Schulte, 1988: 1-27. For accounts of the sometimes voluntary involvement in the killings 
by members of the Wehrmacht, see Neitzel and Welzer, 2012: 136 ff.  
18 The fact that respect was present in practice is supported by both Overmans (2005: 786) 
and Rolf (1988: 45).  
19 However, Rolf (1988: 67) immediately qualifies this quote by saying that ‘the reality of 
their treatment as prisoners belied this pompous official advice.’ 
20 Yves Durand (1982: 324 and 354) thus writes of an ‘effective respect of the quality of 
Jewish soldiers’ by the German Wehrmacht despite the occasional bullying of Jewish POWs. 
